Safeguarding the banking system from financial cycles by Richard E. Randall
General Discussion
Summarized by Richard E. Randall*
Introductory Remarks by the Moderator
Federal Reserve Governor John P. LaWare began the discussion by
offering some deliberately provocative statements to stimulate debate.1
Noting that discussions of banking reform have tended to focus on the
issue of deposit insurance and its effects on the banking system, he
described deposit insurance as arguably the most negative legislative
blow ever struck at the banking system. Deposit insurance provided the
rationale for the subsequent overregulation of banks and their use by
Congress for social goals. The original purpose of deposit insurance, to
protect solvent banks from the contagion of consumer runs on insolvent
banks, was well served; and no taxpayer money has ever been lost as a
result of problems in the commercial banking system. However, the
sorry spectacle of the thrift debacle prompted Congress to impose
greater constraints on the commercial banks.
Governor LaWare sees the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) and its provisions for early intervention and
prompt corrective action as the culmination of the trend toward over-
regulation. In an environment of vocal vilification of the concept of
"too-big-to-fail," orderly and less costly resolution of failing banks was
made more difficult, while Draconian recovery programs were imposed
on struggling banks.
Governor LaWare posed the following questions:
* Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
1 Governor LaWare made it clear that he was speaking for himself and not the Federal
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Does deposit insurance foster moral hazard? Is risk-taking in the
banking system greater than it was before deposit insurance?
In connection with Richard Randall’s proposal, how do we
determine concentration limits? Is concentration per se the real
problem, or is it the relaxation of pricing and terms on loans that
is needed to increase market share?
Are banks runs truly a thing of the past? LaWare noted that the
proximate cause of closing Bank of New England was a run by
insured depositors that depleted deposits by over $1 billion in a
day and a half.
Is a policy of too-big-to-fail inappropriate where failure would
destabilize the financial system and impair the viability of other
institutions? What is wrong with resolving failed banks with
purchase and assumption transactions, which protect the large
depositors, if it makes for a more orderly resolution of the
banks?
Would the integration of banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies in financial service holding companies or even in
universal bank structures tend to protect or further expose banks?
What limits will markets put on capital? Everybody makes the
observation that if we just had more capital we would not have to worry.
In the 1920s, the average capitalization of the commercial banks in the
United States was between 12 and 15 percent of assets. Nonetheless, in
1924 in the midst of a developing boom economy over 600 banks failed.
Capital alone is not the final answer. How far can we go in mandating
higher capital standards? Demands for returns on capital are a limiting
factor, so will not the market ultimately decide how much capital a bank
can have?
Governor LaWare also invited comment on his own proposal to
eliminate moral hazard: make deposit insurance voluntary on the part of
the depositor. Depositors could buy as much insurance as they think
necessary to protect their accounts, but they would pay the premiums
directly. The premium would be "risk-based," reflecting the condition
of the bank. The market ~,ould soon impose its discipline on bank
managements, because deposits would move out of banks with poor
condition ratings.
Bert Ely, banking consultant, questioned Governor LaWare about
the possibility that with voluntary deposit insurance, "free rider"
depositors in large banks deemed too-big-to-fail would let others pay
insurance premiums, while they relied on the assumption that they
would have time to bail out when a serious problem arose. The
governor’s response was that the failure of a reasonably large bank, with
uninsured depositors taking losses, would end such behavior.GENERAL DISCUSSION 149
Summary of the General Discussion
The following is a summary of the general discussion as well as the
question periods that followed each presentation. The material has been
organized under subject headings, and comments are not necessarily in
chronological order.
Financial Cycles and Bank Asset Concentrations
Lynn Browne of the Boston Fed raised the question of whether the
equivalent of the LDC lending situation could take place in the future.
How likely is it that several of the largest banks will make the same bets,
as suggested in Randall’s paper? She cited examples of many banks
racing into the same activity, suggesting a type of herd mentality could
occur again. She noted that her concern was for areas of concentration
involving several banks, rather than a particularly high concentration
involving only a single bank.
John LaWare reinforced this point, citing the current scramble by so
many financial institutions into consumer finance. He deplored the
emphasis put on market share, with the consequence that credit
standards are lowered. Bert Ely saw the herd effect most clearly with
regard to financial markets generally, with assets moving outside the
banking system in part because of constraining bank regulations.
Alex Pollock of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago cited
Charles Kindleberger’s work on financial crises as evidence that we do
not have long to wait for the next one. The risks in banking are
substantial and largely opaque to the public. But if banks were required
to fully disclose all risks in some detail, they would soon divide their
assets and corresponding liabilities into risk classes. The result would be
what Jim Pierce calls a functional bank but Pollock prefers to call
collateralized money. Richard Aspinwall of Chase Manhattan Bank, on
the other hand, asserted that the process of securitization has already
made banks less opaque with respect to risk characteristics. It remains
to be seen, however, whether supervisors have the resolve to react
promptly to capital deficiencies.
Robert Listfield of BEI Golembe referred back to Randall’s paper
and the evidence that five separate events within a decade caused about
two-thirds of the failures of U.S. banks (as measured by assets). Listfield
was concerned, not about isolated random failures, but about times
when systemic risks threaten large segments of the banking industry or
other key financial industries or markets. Coinsurance would not have
inhibited lending in the boom phase of the New England cycle, but it
would have produced a major flight of deposits to banks in a stronger
region, once the New England banking problems surfaced. Banks are
special because they can either contribute to the health of an economy or150
destroy it. Countercyclical actions can help, but the rules of FDICIA, tied
as they are to capital ratios, can destroy the banks they are designed to
save. We can expect more such cycles in the future, and we must smooth
the peaks if banks are to have a soft landing when the cycle turns.
LaWare questioned whether this was the responsibility of the
supervisors or the bankers. Listfield replied, again using New England
as an example, that bank supervisors should have developed the
evidence that the market was moving into a feeding frenzy in commer-
cial real estate development. They should have been more proactive in
stopping this activity, not because of the actions of any one bank, but
because a collection of institutions were moving in a direction that
jeopardized them all. Individual banks cannot see the broader picture
that is visible to the supervisors--if they are looking for it.
Genie Short of the Dallas Fed noted that in the early 1980s, the large
Texas banks were funded through Euromarket CDs issued under lines
of credit provided by New York banks, whereby the contract became
null and void overnight should the borrowing bank use the discount
window. With this safety valve, the New York banks did not require higher
rates despite the obvious energy problems of the Texas banks. This broken
link between those taking the risk and those paying for it enabled the Texas
banks to move aggressively into the real estate market.
Robert Eisenbeis of the University of North Carolina suggested that
highly improbable events sometimes happen and damage banks. Just
because such events occur does not necessarily mean that the market
failed to identify and price the risk. He questioned whether we should
try always to have systems in place to prevent such unlikely events.
George Benston of Emory University ran through the list of recent
financial cycles that caused bank failures and concluded, with hindsight,
that they were all predictable. But it would be very difficult to persuade
market participants that they were being foolish for supporting booming
activities. One answer is diversification, because you do not know
where the next hit is coming from; you just know it will come. Another
answer is to have enough capital to absorb the loss.
Frederick Furlong of the San Francisco Fed puzzled over the
question of whether something inherent in the nature of banks draws
many of them to the same risky areas. They shun diversification, for
some reason. One explanation for this herd instinct is that banks know
that if they all get in the same trouble at once, they will be protected.
Bert Ely suggested that the bankers were acting rationally, for regulated
institutions. Business strategies in unregulated industries focus on
differentiation. Until we get away from one-size-fits-all regulation, we
will continue to see the herd effect. Richard Randall of the Boston Fed
suggested that more intensive competitive pressures on banks in recent
years had much to do with so many banks focusing on the same risky
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Supervisory Intervention against Certain Asset Concentrations
Richard Randall was questioned by some participants about how to
distinguish dangerous asset concentrations, how bank supervisors were
defining concentrations for FDICIA capital provisions, and how super-
visors could pursue an interventionist policy in the face of political
pressures or when supervisory actions were curtailing bank profits.
Randall stressed that the delineation of potentially harmful concentra-
tions was too complex to be reduced to a formula for capital adequacy
purposes, and Edward Ettin of the Board of Governors staff confirmed
that the regulatory agencies had not been able to do that. Randall argued
that some asset categories are inherently riskier than others and that we
must be particularly concerned about concentrations in these types of
assets, construction and development loans being an obvious example.
Lending terms and underwriting standards are also important, but
more difficult to monitor than concentrations. When a bank that has
never had more than 3 percent of loans financing construction and
development suddenly has more than 25 percent, as often happened in
New England in the 1985-89 period, it is time for some supervisory
involvement, Randall declared. Some concentrations in banks with
long-standing niche lending situations might be tolerated, while they
would be inappropriate where many banks are competing for assets
with the same type of risk. Supervisors need to identify the more
important risk concentrations and then examine the underlying eco-
nomic factors that will govern the risks in these areas in the future.
Jane D’Arista of Boston University’s Center for Banking Law
commented favorably on Randall’s proposal, but preferred quantitative
lending constraints to the kind of flexible decision-making on the part of
supervisors called for in his paper. She suggested borrowing from the
macro prudential policies of European central banks two decades ago,
where specific sector limits were set. Banks then would have to convince
supervisors that they could safely exceed such limitations. She also cited
the rapid growth in derivatives as an area of concentration risk that
should receive close attention.
Philip Bartholomew of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
acknowledged that we live in a world of cycles and speculative bubbles,
and that we need to learn to supervise banks in that context. This
involves a different supervisory posture when bubbles are inflating than
after they burst. Bartholomew believes the agencies can develop appro-
priate measures of concentration, but questioned how the supervisors
are to convince the management of overconcentrated banks to back off,
at a time when cash flows are strong and the herd mentality prevalent.
Randall indicated that one approach could be speeches by agency heads
and other forms of "jawboning." His preference, however, is for direct
pressure on the most concentrated and aggressive banks--a shoot-the-152
leaders approach. This would involve senior supervisory officials accom-
panying examiners to meetings, first with senior bank management and
then with directors. Interagency cohesiveness among the regulators
would be essential. While a little pounding on the table may be
necessary, most banks will acquiesce. If they do not, supervisors will
have to have the authority for formal enforcement action. Supervisors
should have well-developed and coordinated policies, procedures, and
training programs. Their policies, as well as the history of the recent
boom and bust cycles they are reacting to, must be generally understood
by the industry, the Administration, and the Congress.
Relevance of the Thrift Experience
John LaWare suggested that recent problems in depository institu-
tions stemmed in large part from the regulatory environment. This was
particularly true of the thrifts, which existed in a highly protected
environment until they were thrust into a new environment without a
clue as to how to respond. Richard Syron, President of the Boston Fed,
questioned whether the thrift industry problem has implications for the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), since thrift behavior and
regulation differed significantly from that of banks. George Kaufman,
from Loyola’s College of Business, put much of the blame on regulatory
forbearance, which FDICIA was designed to combat.
James Pierce of the University of California at Berkeley sees at least
one lesson in the savings and loan debacle. The thrift industry had lost
its economic function, but the government tried to keep the resources in
that industry through increasingly desperate methods. This introduced
great moral hazard and fostered the entry of new participants into the
industry, including many contractors. Now banking is losing its eco-
nomic function as others provide traditional banking products just as
cheaply, yet the government is continuing to restrict the powers of
banks and bank holding companies. We must not replay the savings and
loan problem with the banks. The thrift industry repeatedly said that not
one dollar of taxpayer money had been spent in backing its deposit
insurance fund. In the same vein, the full faith and credit of the
government is behind the FDIC. That has value so, in that sense,
taxpayer money is being used to support the banks.
Randall noted again that the banking industry absorbs deposit
insurance losses. Taxpayer dollars would become involved only when
the whole banking system was so weakened that it could no longer
absorb the losses. This occurred in the thrift industry, but it is not the
case with the banking industry. Bert Ely challenged Pierce’s comparison
of banks to thrifts, which he characterized as a disaster waiting to
happen. Ely does not see the banking function as dead or obsolete, but
asserts that it is being strangled by government.GENERAL DISCUSSION 153
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA)
George Kaufman spoke in defense of FDICIA. He indicated that in
selling to Congress the concepts of early intervention and prompt
corrective action, his intent, and that of other members of the Shadow
Financial Regulatory Group, was to codify what supervisors should be
doing. He noted that they had been doing the right thing 90 percent of
the time, but that lapses had occurred. He cited Penn Square Bank and
Bank of New England as examples of lapses that necessitated making
appropriate actions mandatory. He is disappointed in the supervisory
response; the proponents thought at the time that supervisors would
welcome the law to deflect political or industry pressure to forbear.
Kaufman noted that the Act is having the intended effect: unin-
sured depositors took losses in only 10 percent of failures in 1991, 50
percent in 1992, and in 1993 to date, nearly 100 percent. The signal is
filtering through to the market. Capital ratios have improved tremen-
dously, partly because of economic conditions conducive to profitability,
but also because of market discipline. According to Kaufman, the
experience cited by LaWare of numerous failures in the 1920s of banks
with high capital ratios involved mostly very small banks. It is rare for
economic capital to be depleted quickly, so strong capital ratios are very
important. Kaufman is disappointed that supervisors specified such low
capital thresholds in carrying out FDICIA provisions.
LaWare responded that supervisors like the additional authority to
close banks before they become insolvent. The problem is that often
they have little choice but to close banks when their capital gets down to
2 percent, even when they can be resuscitated.
Richard Syron argued that earlier closure of Bank of New England
would not have reduced the loss to the FDIC. Kaufman responded that
prompt corrective action is intended to prevent firms from getting into
Bank of New England’s condition in the first place. Syron replied that to
do that, one would have had to focus on loan concentrations, because if
one focused on capital ratios, intervention would have come quite late.
George Benston argued for greater disclosure so that the public can
decide when loan concentrations become unreasonable. In addition to
loan concentration numbers, he advocated disclosing banks’ CAMEL
r’atings.2 Richard Randall pointed out that commercial real estate con-
centrations were publicly identifiable from bank condition reports in
each of the regional real estate cycles of the 1980s. Also, the CAMEL
2 Bank supervisory ratings based on Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings
and Liquidity.154
ratings did not reflect the developing problems until about the time that
they were reported in the newspapers.
Bert Ely suggested that higher capital standards increase the incen-
tive to securitize lower-risk assets, thus increasing the proportion of
higher-risk assets on bank balance sheets. George Benston replied that
investors, particularly acquirers of subordinated debt, will price the risk
and thereby influence the level of risk-taking bankers choose. Benston
would like to see capital requirements as high as 15 to 20 percent of assets.
Hal Scott of Harvard Law School questioned imposing much higher
capital ratios on U.S. banks as compared to Japanese banks. Benston
cited the NAFTA debate, arguing that U.S. consumers should not
subsidize U.S. banks (by tolerating lower capital ratios) so that they can
compete with foreign banks that are being subsidized by their taxpayers.
Paul Horvitz of the University of Houston argued for the strict rules
of FDICIA, indicating that forbearance seldom works. He acknowledged
that two or three of the largest banks in the country might have been
closed in the 1980s, had FDICIA rules been in place, but he suggested
that with clear rules, the banks might not have gotten into such a situation.
He cited congressionally mandated forbearance by the FDIC on about 300
banks in the mid 1980s, expressing the view that the agencies did not do
well in selecting banks likely to recover if given more time.
John LaWare objected to the word "forbearance": the use of
supervisory discretion by the banking agencies is clearly distinguishable
from the notorious regulatory forbearance of the savings and loan
problem. He stated that without the leeway to deal with the LDC crisis
in the way that we did, we would have experienced a much more
serious financial crisis. Imposition of write-downs on LDC loans in 1982
and 1983 on the basis of perceived collectibility would have wiped out
the capital of perhaps the 10 largest banks in the country.
Robert Eisenbeis argued that it was not valid to judge the FDICIA
rules on the basis of what might have happened in a past situation, without
considering the effect of penalties and potential consequences of risk-
taking in averting the problem. He also referred to an earlier study by
Allan Berger of the Federal Reserve Board staff that associated high
profitability with high capital. Eisenbeis inferred that the profitability of
Japanese banks currently is low because of very low capital levels.
Market Discipline
Hal Scott contested a statement by George Benston that uninsured
depositors in U.S. banks do not take hits, noting that they did lose in the
majority of failures in 1992. Benston speculated that in a future Conti-
nental-size failure the authorities would not allow depositors to take
losses.
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tween coinsurance and reinsurance and establishing when "too-big-to-
fail" began to imply essentially unlimited deposit insurance. Arthur
Rolnick of the Minneapolis Fed replied that this was so at least from the
time of the Continental failure. Both Benston and Rolnick emphasized
that the authorities should impose substantial "haircuts" on uninsured
depositors in future failures of large banks.
Myron Kwast of the Federal Reserve Board staff reported that,
based on surveys, the percentage of U.S. households with potentially
uninsured bank deposits has risen from about 2 percent to over 5.5
percent in 10 years. While this suggests that the potential for market
discipline has been increasing, Kwast recommended that we learn more
about the characteristics of these uninsured depositors before relying on
them for market discipline.
Hal Scott interpreted Kwast’s report of increased holdings of
uninsured deposits by households during a decade of severe banking
problems as evidence of just how secure the current deposit insurance
system makes people feel, and how much stability it provides the
economy. He sees it as a warning that making radical changes in the
system could be disruptive. Maybe these people are foolish for having
kept their money in U.S. banks these past 10 years, but imagine the
alternative, had they all decided to take their funds out. Rolnick
responded that we must consider how the nature of uninsured depos-
itors would change as we increased the likelihood of their taking losses.
We have given too much security to depositors at the expense of the
taxpayer; moral hazard must be taken seriously.
Subordinated Debt and Coinsurance
James Pierce elicited from George Benston assurances that subordi-
nated debtholders would, in effect, be designated loss-takers for the
purpose of stimulating market discipline. They would have no protec-
tion except the cushion provided by stockholders and covenants such as
restrictions on dividends or the power to replace the board of directors.
Philip Bartholomew noted that the market for subordinated debt of
small banks is very limited.
Robert Eisenbeis sees little marginal benefit in terms of market
discipline in having small depositors at risk. He noted the point made by
Arthur Rolnick, that imposing heavy hits on larger depositors might
simply tempt supervisors to keep large banks open. If this is indeed the
case, then Eisenbeis suggested that this implies that the basic deposit
insurance coverage is too low, not too high. Alton Gilbert of the St.
Louis Fed argued that, with coinsurance, the bulk of the deposits are
insured by the government-backed fund, and this implies government
supervision. If this supervision proves to be so bad that large losses
occur, it is not inappropriate for the government to be at risk.156
The Risk in Functional Banking
Robert Eisenbeis questioned the wisdom of creating a riskless asset
by providing full deposit insurance for transaction accounts in monetary
service companies. We need some form of riskless asset in the economy,
but why not let Treasury bills serve that function? James Pierce re-
sponded that his proposal accomplishes a great deal, including the
elimination of the need for most supervisory functions by the creation of
a federally insured money fund. Twenty years from now, consideration
can be given to eliminating that government guarantee. While the
functional bank would not totally be riskless, the risk can be priced and
is therefore insurable.
Jane D’Arista suggested that, by acquiring commercial paper, the
monetary service companies would be funding finance companies that
make opaque loans in competition with banks (financial service compa-
nies under Pierce’s proposal). The finance companies require credit
enhancements on their paper from the banks, which currently benefit
from deposit insurance. She asks who will coinsure in the future. Pierce
is not concerned that private entities will coinsure each other. The
monetary service companies will not be able to give credit enhance-
ments. He considers these essentially liquidity enhancements, and
notes the importance of access to the discount window.
In response to a question by Bert Ely, Pierce indicated that a
financial institution that holds opaque loans was probably insurable, but
the federal government need not be the insurer. No externality prevents
the private funding of opaque loans. Hal Scott wondered what the
functional banking scheme would do to the cost of credit for firms that
currently borrow from banks. Pierce suggested that, on the basis of
finance company interest rates and the downward trend in the volume
of opaque loans, the implications for the cost of credit would not be
great.
Hal Scott also raised the issue of potential failures of the "broader
banks," or financial service companies in Pierce’s parlance. They could
experience runs in non-transaction accounts and average people would
lose money, giving rise to pressure on Congress for a bailout. Robert
Litan of the U.S. Department of Justice saw this as a lesser problem than
a run on the commercial paper market. To avoid the small savers
problem, financial service companies could be required to issue their
liabilities in larger units, at least initially, so as to be funded by
institutional investors.
Effects of Functional Banking on the Payments Mechanism
Under James Pierce’s functional banking proposal, monetary ser-
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FDIC, but they would be allowed to take only very limited risks. Pierce
envisions that such corporations not be allowed to incur daylight over-
drafts. Alton Gilbert argued that you cannot just prohibit daylight over-
drafts without making radical changes in corporate cash management.
Edward Ettin agreed with Gilbert but suggested that the risks of
losses on daylight overdrafts are insurable. Pierce prefers to avoid
having monetary service companies grant daylight overdrafts because
the risks would necessitate regulatory review. For the same reason, he
does not think such companies should be involved in settling foreign
exchange transactions. Sheila Tschinkel of the Atlanta Fed reminded the
group that all transactions are ultimately settled through the banking
system.
Runs on Banks
George Benston asserted that the banking system is not dependent
upon the confidence of depositors, even though individual banks may
be. People are going to put their money somewhere. Even if they shift
to currency, the central bank could offset such a move. It is only a run
to gold that creates a problem.
George Kaufman worries about runs to currency by small deposi-
tors, and therefore he would limit coinsurance to amounts above some
minimum level, say $10,000. The large banks do not need deposit
insurance protection over $100,000, because large depositors will not
run to currency. Large depositors impose market discipline, and the
losses incurred in large bank failures have been very small. They would
be still lower if troubled banks were closed before their capital reached
zero.
The Lender of Last Resort
Robert Eisenbeis made the point that providing liquidity to banks
through the discount window does not necessarily relate today to
protecting the level of the money supply or to preventing sustained runs
on institutions, but, rather, seems more related to protecting the flow of
transactions through the payments system. Markets are becoming more
global, and all transactions must clear against good balances. Govern-
ment intervention in financial markets, such as occurred when
Chrysler’s problems led to concern about the commercial paper market,
is a separate issue and not related to clearing specific transactions. James
Pierce’s functional banking proposal does not address this distinction
between settling payments system transactions and meeting more
fundamental liquidity needs.
Richard Aspinwall questioned whether the lender of last resort was
truly accessible to large banks with liquidity problems in 1990 and early158
1991. In this period of anxiety over bank solvency, large banks borrow-
ing at the window would have been assumed to be in trouble and
subject to runs.
George Benston questioned whether there should be a lender of last
resort. Open market operations can deal with a systemwide liquidity
crisis, while individual banks that cannot manage to borrow in the
private market should be allowed to fail. If banks had that possibility to
worry about, they would behave differently.
Private Deposit Insurance
Bert Ely’s answer to a problem that affects many banks in a
particular region at the same time is his cross-guarantee proposal,
whereby the various guarantors price the risk for individual banks.
Guarantors would have strong incentives to watch the whole financial
marketplace through their syndicate agents, and they would price the
option on their capital so as to promptly raise the cost of credit going
into speculative bubbles. Ely noted that the private insurance proposal
cannot be implemented until a critical mass of subscribers has been
achieved. He also stressed that large institutions would be allowed to
fail, even though one objective is to avoid destabilizing failures.
Richard Aspinwall thought that Robert Litan had not adequately
presented the case against private insurance in his discussion. Several
participants had already referred to inadequate capital in the banking
industry, so the proposal to establish syndicates so that banks can insure
each other sounds like a financial shell game. Also, enormous conflict-
ing incentives would be created, whereby large banks would not
criticize each others’ practices for fear of return criticism. Risk would
shift from the government to the private sector, but it would not stay
there for very long.
Edward Kane argued that we need not and should not seek to pick
a single device to rely on for bank safety. Private reinsurance, coinsur-
ance, collateralized deposits, uninsured deposits, and subordinated debt
could all contribute at the margin. He maintained that government super-
visory efficiency could be substantially enhanced by assigning the first tier
of depositor losses to a coinsuring private entity (a "surety"). This would
put at risk an entity whose debt and stock values would depend squarely
on capital-market estimates of the quality of bank supervision.
Kane noted that such private coinsurance is essentially a perfor-
mance bond and that the bond need not be provided only (if at all) by
syndicates made up of banks. Locating the proactive supervisory
activities of bank examination and insurance eligibility in the private
sector would put healthy pressure on federal regulators to better
manage their second-tier risk exposure. Capital-market monitoring of
surety debt and stock value would make more transparent the conse-GENERAL DISCUSSION 159
quences of politically or bureaucratically driven forbearance decisions.
Kane saw promise in performance bonding over subordinated debt,
because the bonding company would have its own supervisory force
and receive better whistle-blowing information on risk-taking as a result
of the regular interaction between the bonding agents and the banks.
A Concentrated Banking System
One of the discussants had complained that the symposium papers
did not address sufficiently the subjects of interstate branching and
broader banking powers. Randall observed that branching and ex-
panded powers imply greater concentration of the banking or financial
services industries. He stated that it would be prudent to develop a
better understanding of financial cycles and ways to control them before
adopting changes that would accelerate the trend toward concentration.
John LaWare challenged this view by citing a lower failure rate in
such highly concentrated banking industries as those of Canada, En-
gland, and other large European countries. James Pierce would add
Japan to the list but cautioned against drawing inferences from the bank
mortality rates in these countries, because behind-the-scenes arrange-
ments are made to keep the banks whole. He warned that in a highly
concentrated banking system a very large troubled bank might be able to
push the government around.
Calls for a Broader Focus
Jane D’Arista argued that the symposium papers focused too
narrowly on only a part of the financial system, particularly with respect
to financial guarantees. She noted that we have developed a broader
system of guarantees relating to securities, insurance, and pensions in
addition to bank deposits. She proposed that the government provide
limited protection against the failure of financial institutions directly to
each individual, by Social Security number, and allow the individual to
decide how to allocate the amount. The limit might be $100,000 or some
other number. In addition, all transaction balances at banks would be
fully guaranteed.
Edward Ettin raised the possibility of a broader safety net, one that
might to some extent encompass the life insurance, securities, and
pension industries. He noted that deposit insurance is constantly in the
way, creating moral hazard, ensuring that future calamities involving
banks will arise, and conflicting with allowing banks into new activities.
Nonetheless, it is becoming more difficult to distinguish banks from
other financial institutions, and Ettin is concerned that some of the
problems that gave rise to the safety net for banks have shifted
elsewhere. We should be thinking about the potential for systemic risk160
arising from the activities of other financial institutions. This implies
thinking about limited supervision and discount window access for
certain nonbanks to minimize systemic risk concerns, but without
extending the federal safety net or regulation unnecessarily.
In the context of the functional bank proposal, Myron Kwast is
concerned not only about payments and settlement, but about the
public good externalities of the financial intermediation function. He
notes that this function is moving to all kinds of institutions. What
remains in the banking system would be segregated from the narrow
banks and normal access to the discount window. Kwast questions how
you limit access to the discount window for functions considered
important to the public interest.
James Pierce responded that you first have to address the argument
that systemic problems can be handled with monetary policy. Systemic
problems that cannot be handled in this way may be susceptible to the
provision of ample liquidity through the discount window. He would
have no trouble with lending to insurance companies in an emergency,
as long as rules were well defined. This is consistent with the functional
approach he advocated in his paper.
Arthur Rolnick suggested that the term systemic risk may be
overused, calling attention to work by George Kaufman on the rarity of
bank panics and the question of whether bank runs are good or bad.
Rolnick asked whether failures of banks or other financial institutions
represent market failures, and indicated that we should start talking
about solutions only to the extent that they do. He doubts that we have
seen a market failure in the insurance industry, and suggested that even
in the banking industry, what occurred may have been less a market
failure than something of a more political nature.
Relationship between Bank Failures and the Real Economy
Robert Eisenbeis suggested that we started out being concerned
about the implications of systemic bank failures for the real economy,
and now need to consider ways to protect the banking system from real
sector problems. Bert Ely argued that feedback of the real economy to
the banking system arose because a lot of mispriced credit flowed out of
the banks, thrifts, and insurance companies into the real sector, causing
overbuilding and speculation. Once the bubble burst, the problems
came back on the financial system, so a circularity exists between
banking and the real economy.
Philip Bartholomew observed that many bank failures have oc-
curred recently in several foreign countries. Situations such as those in
Norway, Sweden, and Finland amounted to the virtual failure of the
whole system, and have created real problems in getting the economy
back on its feet.